International conference

Values in Argumentation
Values of Argumentation

Reasoning and Argumentation Lab
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Lisbon, Portugal
28-29 June 2017

Booklet of Abstracts
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Keynotes

Keynote 1

Jason Stanley    Yale University (USA)
The manipulation of value for political gain
Wed, June 28, 9:15-10:15

Mass communication works by focusing the audience's attention upon certain cherished values, for example equality, social justice, law and order, security, Christianity, European identity, or national pride. Demagogues seek to shift the focus of attention to values that can be strategically manipulated, such as "traditional values". In this talk, I will set out how demagogic speech changes the conversation by shifting mass focus of attention to certain values. For example, by switching attention to values of "law and order", and connecting immigrants to crime, demagogues can gather support by appealing to racist ideologies, or by switching attention to "traditional values", demagogues can gather support by appealing to homophobia, misogyny, or religious prejudice. I will describe how switching the frame of values can alter the discussion space by excluding legitimate policy options. In the final part of the talk I will address how we can respond to these strategic shifts in value. Focusing on concrete struggles for social justice in Switzerland and the United States, I will attempt to answer the question: what methods exist to return the space of public reason to one in which policy options obscured by demagogic tactics are once again in view?

Keynote 2

Christopher Tindale University of Windsor (Canada)
Disrupting the course of civilization: How argumentation transforms reason
Thu, June 29, 9:00-10:00

Some views are so extreme they focus the attention of entire societies, consume public debates, and monopolize the energy of a generation. And yet many of those views that “may disrupt the whole course of civilization,” do so successfully and move from the extreme to the accepted. Canadian suffragist Nellie McClung, from whom I take my title, held such a view. She argued the radical position that women should be entitled to vote. She is an interesting example of argumentation that transforms what is reasonable, and how this can be accomplished. In fact, such examples point to a number of important ways argumentation operates: to modify the cognitive environments in which we live; to promote an appreciation of diversity and an understanding of alternative positions; to provide standards of reason by which we measure ourselves relative to our goals and the goals of others.

In this talk, I explore some of the strategies involved in addressing extremism and transforming the values at the heart of extremist discourse to make it more accessible, and even acceptable, and, in some instances, melding it with the status quo. Through some conceptual analysis and the discussion of several case studies, including that of McClung in Canada and the civil rights movement in the US, I will consider how some views are modified over time through the production of argumentation directed at society rather than individuals.
Paper Presentations

Saliha Bayır
Istanbul Technical University (Turkey)
Naturalistic fallacy in Hume
Wed, June 28, 17:30-18:00

Notoriously, the naturalistic fallacy amounts to an attempt to infer a prescriptive claim from a descriptive one. It was first explicitly exposed by Hume. Yet, there exists many conflicting efforts to reconcile Hume’s alleged rejection of the inference with his philosophy, for the claim that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’ seems to presuppose a dichotomy of facts and values, and such a dichotomy seems to run contrary to Hume’s emotivism and naturalism. In my paper, I will first present a systematic classification of the various responses to the naturalistic fallacy. Then, I will argue that Hume did not support a distinction between facts and values.

Patrick Bondy
Brandon University (Canada)
Reconciling non-epistemic reasons for belief and epistemic standards for argument evaluation
Wed, June 28, 14:00-14:30

I argue that there are good non-epistemic reasons for belief. On the face of it, such reasons pose a threat to the adequacy of epistemic frameworks for argument evaluation. But I argue that there is in fact no conflict, because a good non-epistemic reason R for a belief B can always be displayed in an argument where R features among the premises and B is the conclusion, and this argument will meet epistemic standards. If a subject S has R and holds B on the basis of R, but via an inference that fails the meet appropriate epistemic standards, then B is not properly supported by R: we might say that B lacks “doxastic practical justification.”

Paula Castro
University Institute of Lisbon ISCTE-IUL (Portugal)
The legal and the legitimate: Re-opening Antigone for revisiting the climate change and biodiversity debates
Thu, June 29, 15:30-16:00

I will re-open Sophocles’ Antigone with two goals. The first is to offer a psycho-social reading of the play’s tensions between the legitimate and the legal, showing how Antigone and Creon, respectively, try to legitimate an (illegal) action and a new law; here I will further explore how the tension legitimate/legal illustrates also how conflicts between the public sphere (guided by shared, but also heterogeneous and dilemmatic values) and the political sphere of state institutions (which reifies only some of the values of the former) can be dealt with by “politics as necessity” or by “politics as contingency”. The second is discussing how these two tensions are productive for understanding today’s public contestation of the legitimacy of (some of) the new EU ecological laws.
Through appropriation, the members of a group can use among themselves the slur targeting their own group, in such a way that the slur is not offensive anymore and expresses solidarity and intimacy. Such uses are taken to (i) challenge silentism, the thesis according to which slurs should be simply banned, and (ii) raise problems for most existing accounts of slurs. I argue that at least some of these uses give rise to an argument allegedly in favor of silentism, the Justification Argument, according to which appropriative uses of slurs are no less problematic than offensive uses. I discuss a way to endorse the Justification Argument but still reject silentism and propose a parallel between appropriation and affirmative action.

Daniel H. Cohen
Colby College (USA)
Virtue argumentation, value argumentation, and the virtue of a thick skin
Thu, June 29, 14:00-14:30

The biggest hurdle to fruitful arguments about values is that arguers identify with their positions, making it difficult to hear criticism and almost impossible to change one’s views in response to reasons. The problem is not merely loss of face: it is loss of Self. Critical detachment can help. This paper distinguishes several distinct virtues – and also some vices – that fall under that rubric and delineates their roles in arguing about values and their value for theorizing about arguing about values. The concluding section argues for the practical, pedagogical, and theoretical benefits to be gained from acknowledging these virtues.

Cristina Corredor
University of Valladolid (Spain)
Normative arguments, context of assessment and cooperative domain
Wed, June 28, 16:30-17:00

In schematic form, arguments in support of normative statements can be reconstructed as follows: (D) the considered case is a case of S, therefore (C) one ought to do A, because (W) in cases such as S, one ought to do A. Ought-statements such as (W) are normative claims that embed a deontic modal verb. My suggestion is that, in order to give an account of processes of deliberation in which an agreement about normative statements such as (C) and (W) is at stake, we need a notion of assessment for deontic modals that is not contextually restricted in the ways other theories have contended (e.g. standard semantic theories, relativism, indexicalism.)
value conflicts. From the other hand, we just have to recognize the existence of a variety of ‘language games’, each governed by its own internal rules. Both theoretical perspective have no role for rhetoric. We will try to show, with reference to sophistic and Aristotelian reflection, that rhetorical framework offers the best answer to the unavoidable tension between democracy, which requires acknowledgment of human fallibility, and moral conviction which everyone normally holds with certainty.

Ana Dimishkovska  
*University Ss. Cyril and Methodius (Macedonia)*

**Argumentation, justice and value pluralism**

Wed, June 28, 17:00-17:30

The main goal of this paper is to argue in favour of the thesis that the legal controversies in which the final decision is accompanied by published dissenting opinion(s) can plausibly be treated as instances of “meta-level” deep disagreements. They are, in principle, based on the difference in value hierarchies of different individuals involved in collective judicial deliberation, which are related to the prioritisation of different legal, ethical and societal values in the controversy at hand.

Thomas Goodnight  
*University of Southern California (USA)*

**Abstract and concrete values: Fields of justification**

Thu, June 29, 18:30-19:00

This paper examines a logic of good reasons grounded in Perelman’s contrast of abstract and concrete values. I examine Boltanski and Thevenot’s *Economies of Worth* as a post-Bourdieu sociology of justification. How does argumentation work that blend fields of value in ways that create presence?

Jean-Claude Guerrini  
*Université de Lyon (France)*

**Values as an argumentative resort. The axiological dimension of discourse in a crisis situation (France, November 2015)**

Thu, June 29, 11:30-12:00

Values never appear so well as when they are in conflict with each other or when they compete with other modes of justification: a crisis situation is particularly conducive to the examination of their functioning. After the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, the "appeal to values" was much used as a means to articulate the emotion of the population, giving rise to specific forms of epideictic discourse. In the wake of the New Rhetoric, we will look at how the invocation, convocation or advocacy of values are used. But according to some commentators, this type of argumentation was considered as an impoverishment of the public debate. This provoked an argument about its legitimacy which we will discuss.
How could reasonable social choices be formed when values are indeterminate? Our answer comes in three main steps. In a first step, we argue that while rational choice theory and supervaluationist theories could be used to identify necessary criteria for reasonableness, they are not sufficient. Such theories succeed in eliminating irrational elements leaving us with a set of non-rankable alternatives. They fail, however, to provide us with reasons to pick a specific element from that set. In a second step, we argue that a theory of reasonable social choice must complement the already identified criteria so that a best alternative can be picked. In a third step, we defend such a theory.

Darrin Hicks  
*University of Denver (USA)*

**Argumentation and discretionary power**

Thu, June 29, 11:00-11:30

The general aim of the essay is to offer an account of discretionary power. Its specific aim is to propose a model for arguing over the application of discretion, including defining the shifting definitions of reasonableness in these contests and offering suggestions as to what constitutes the “most reasonable” interpretation of a rule or procedure, so as to aid those contesting the abuse of discretion.

Catherine Hundleby  
*University of Windsor (Canada)*

**Argumentation schemes and the value of ignorance**

Thu, June 29, 10:30-11:00

Presumptive reasoning, appealing to this or that type of argumentation scheme, marks our inability to get a complete information regarding some question, and it reifies the attendant ignorance. However argumentation schemes also valuably move inquiry ahead and give it direction. In choosing one argumentation scheme, trusting it over others, it gains priority; and the neglected options recede from the realm of possible understanding. They become cemented as forms of ignorance, what Robert Proctor (2006) describes as “lost realm” ignorance. They constitute forms of ignorance integral to our ability to continue reasoning and thus having their own epistemological value, as Cynthia Townley suggests ignorance may do (2006; 2011).

Scott Jacobs  
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (USA)*

**The Silent Scream is a fallacious film that uses a demonstrative strategy that argumentation theory needs to take seriously**

Thu, June 29, 12:00-12:30

Seemingly intractable disagreement can be the natural result of reasonable efforts at argument. Achieving resolution in such situations may require nonstandard strategies. The Silent Scream illustrates one candidate strategy that is in-principle legitimate: show audiences how they feel in a concrete situation. The video purports to show audiences an abortion “from
the victim’s vantage point.” Though viewers tend to believe that their strong emotional reactions come from actually having viewed an ultrasound presentation of an abortion, the “seen” reality is almost wholly a matter of vivid imagination activated by the narrator’s language choice. Showing rather than telling is a distinction that argumentation theorists need to recognize and deploy in addressing the problems of moral argument and deep disagreement.

Henrique Jales Ribeiro  
*University of Coimbra (Portugal)*

**The values of argumentation and the threat from postmodernism and relativism**  
Wed, June 28, 18:00-18:30

According to relativism, it is impossible for the argumentation theorist to decide between opposite argumentations concerning crucial issues for contemporary societies, such as euthanasia, abortion, or the refugee crisis, choosing one in detriment of the other, or others, i.e., evaluating them as “good” or “bad”. In other words, for relativism, two or more opposite and conflicting argumentations on the same subject are equally acceptable. If this was the case, argumentation theory and its objectives – as traditionally conceived – would be irremediably condemned or, at least, would need to be completely reformulated. The author analyzes the role of relativism within argumentation theory, showing how and why, generally speaking, this theory will not necessarily be mortally wounded if it acknowledges or accepts relativism, provided it does so in new terms and from a new perspective.

Maurizio Manzin  
*University of Trento (Italy)*

**From law and values to law as a value**  
Thu, June 29, 17:00-17:30

After a short survey on some very influential accounts in legal philosophy I will take into account a philosophical perspective according to which it is not the case of a relationship that should or should not been sought between law and values, because law is a value in itself. To this account people as individuals always lack truth and therefore need dialogue, which is a value in itself, and law is a peculiar kind of dialogue. The conclusive part aims at being a partially new insight on the conference topic, because it tries to overlap the s.c. philosophy of dialogue with the classical perspective on dialectical and rhetorical argument.

Teresa Marques  
*University of Barcelona (Spain)*

**Words, action, and conflict**  
Wed, June 28, 11:00-11:30

How do words lead to action? To start unpacking an answer, I argue, we need to rethink the role of expressive presuppositions. I focus mainly on derogatory/laudatory language and thick value terms. I argue that a theory must meet three desiderata: the speech under consideration is expressive of action guiding attitudes; it builds connections among those who accept it; and it is motivational. I will explore how some accounts of common ground as a set of shared commitments, or shared plans, point towards the possibility of expressive presuppositions as expressions of conative attitudes, and how this helps in understanding conflicts of attitudes and disagreements.
Sanjay Modgil  
*King’s College London (UK)*

The role of logic based argument and dialogue in addressing the AI value loading problem  
Wed, June 28, 15:30-16:00

Recent successes in artificial intelligence have been accompanied by warnings of the possible dangers of AI. It is argued that machines may formally achieve their operators’ goals in ways that may conflict with their operators’ values. This concern has acquired renewed urgency given that a feature of machine learning is the discovery of un-forseen ways of achieving goals, and that achievement of any operator’s goal will incentivise machines to thwart corrective measures to prevent harm. I will argue that current attempts to address this concern are inadequate; what is needed is that AI systems and humans engage in comprehensive, rational exchange of arguments purposed to decide ethical issues. To meet requirements for such ‘value deliberation’ dialogues will require building on current research in logic-based models of argument and dialogue. I will review this research as well as point to future research challenges.

Dima Mohammed  
*Nova University of Lisbon (Portugal)*

Sally Jackson  
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (USA)*

Arguing for and against values  
Wed, June 28, 10:30-11:00

Values are generally supposed (both by theorists and by ordinary people) to be the shared starting points for argumentation, used in justification of evaluative claims or practical arguments. What happens when values themselves are the subject of disagreement? In this paper we examine recent political rhetoric (of Donald Trump, John McCain, Marine Le Pen, and Emmanuel Macron) in which the core disagreements are over contrasting value frameworks. We consider whether, and how, argument over value frameworks can be productive, including what argumentative strategies can be used either to challenge or to defend a value. Values are difficult to challenge and difficult to change, but nothing people feel, believe, or do is truly beyond examination through argument.

Hili Razinsky  
*University of Lisbon (Portugal)*

Ambivalence informs the logic of value judgement and deliberation  
Wed, June 28, 12:00-12:30

My new book, *Ambivalence: A Philosophical Exploration* (RLI: London & NY) argues in particular that value judgements are often partially objectivist (objectivity-directed, cognitive) as well as subject to argumentation, and yet the received model to understanding such judgement and argumentation is flawed. I argue that questions such as whether an action ought to be taken, or whether a policy is good often call for ambivalent answers, including the answer that the action ought and yet ought not to be taken, or that policy is good yet bad, and that such answers can be meaningful, elucidating, practical and epistemically appropriate. Moreover, such objectivist ambivalence of value judgement is central to the logic of value judgement, which must be understood accordingly.
Christopher Roser  
*Humboldt University, Berlin (Germany)*

**Is success in argumentation a rational value? On Isocrates’ and Plato’s justification of argumentation**

Thu, June 29, 18:00-18:30

It is an almost universally shared view today, that arguments are of great rational and epistemic value. This is closely connected with the view that there is an essential link between rationality and argumentation. It is commonly assumed that rationality essentially consist in providing and weighting arguments (e.g. Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action*). However, this link and the rational value of argumentation, so I argue, rests on non-trivial assumptions and involves non-trivial theoretical commitments. The idea of this link originates in Ancient Greece and in the idea that logos is both a linguistic entity and the mark of rationality. Plato and Aristotle make this idea, for the first time, the core of an explicit and extensive theory of both theoretical and practical rationality. Thereby, they justify the rational value of argumentation. In my paper, I consider how this rational valuation of argumentation comes about in Ancient Greece. By considering this Ancient debate, it will become clearer what assumptions and theoretical commitments one needs to accept to defend the idea that argumentation is essentially rationally valuable.

Blake Scott  
*University of Windsor (Canada)*

**Beyond the efficacious: Evaluating values in the New Rhetoric**

Thu, June 29, 14:30-15:00

In this paper I argue that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s *The New Rhetoric* provides normative criteria of argument strength beyond mere effectiveness. These criteria of reasonable argumentation, however, must not be understood as static and audience-independent, but rather as dynamic values that undergo refinement and modification through practical application. The negativist reading of *The New Rhetoric* that I propose allows us to see that beyond arguing about particular values within argumentation, arguers and audiences are also arguing at a second level about particular argumentative values.

Marija Snieckute  
*University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands)*

**Populism and argument**

Thu, June 29, 15:00-15:30

Populism – one of the contemporary “trends” in the general political discourse - cannot be imagined without the use of arguments. Even if there might be reservations made in regards to the idea that the use of argumentation is settled at the core of populist discourse, populism and argument are intrinsically related. Moreover, given a diverse array of possible meanings, both concepts are also inherently normative, especially given the context of democracy. In this paper, I’ll address the issue of the relationship between populism and argument, and the way the social scientific (“ideational”) and argumentation (“pragma-dialectical”) perspectives could mutually benefit for the study of value, argument and populism.
Jingjing Wu  
*Tilburg University (The Netherlands)*

**God, river, human rights: Can we justify river’s rights by religious values?**

Thu, June 29, 16:30-17:00

In its recent decision, an Indian Court considers Rivers Ganga and Yamuna having the rights as human beings. However, when the environmentalists are still celebrating this groundbreaking decision, this paper has to spoil the fun and asks: could religious values be used to justify fundamental rights in a legal discourse? This paper first expounds on the religious reasoning found in the given decision. It then inquires the general foundations of human rights arguments, and further explores the possible conflicts and repercussions when justifying fundamental rights with religious values. This paper concludes by asserting although this decision is certainly a positive development for the environment, it may trigger some legitimate concern from the human rights point of view.

Frank Zenker  
*Lund University (Sweden)*

Ulrike Hahn  
*Birkbeck, University of London (UK)*

**The strength of co-value argumentation**

Wed, June 28, 15:00-15:30

Value-systems display internal order. But since actions in pursuit of one value can have (psychological, practical, social) consequences that are incompatible with pursuing another, this yields a circumplex organization of them. Values that potentially conflict in specific cases occur in opposite positions, and more compatible values in adjacent positions. This structure is supported by patterns of strong to fairly strong correlations between subjects’ ratings of the (ordinal) importance of values, allowing for cautious predictions regarding the strength of arguments combining values. The strength of ‘co-value argumentation’ thus depends on the causal connection between antecedent and conclusion value, and the antecedent value’s importance, ceteris paribus. The talk provides background on empirical work, the probabilistic model, and problematizes the above predictions.