ID building, room 1.05
This paper argues that perceiving belongs within the cognitive fold, not outside of it. It reviews and rejects the rationale for drawing sharp distinction between perception and cognition introduced by modular theories of mind. Modular theories assume that perception has an informational encapsulated character that marks it out as different from other forms of cognition. These theories will be rejected on the explanatory power of predictive processing, which dissolves the perception/cognition distinction. Predictive processing accounts, however, have been challenged for embracing a problematic, overly intellectualist vision of cognition across the board. It is shown that, even if we accept the full force of such critiques, there is a way to construe the predictive processing proposal such that it leaves space for a more nuanced account of perception – one that embraces the right degree of intellectualism and provides a way of retaining some important insights from the failed modular theories of perception. Finally, it is shown that reading predictive processing theories through this lens does not give us reason to think of any form of perceiving as non-cognitive – rather, it enables us to see all forms of perception as forms of cognition.